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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee,: Case No. 940698-CA 
v. : 
AMORICO RAMON ARCHULETTA, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for burglary of a 
dwelling, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-202 (1990) (Count I), theft of a firearms, second degree 
felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990) 
(Counts II-V), theft, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990) (Counts VI), and possession of a 
firearm by a parolee, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2)(a) (Supp. 1994), in the Seventh 
Judicial District Court in and for Carbon County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable, Bruce K. Halliday, presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3 (2) (k) (Supp. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented in this appeal are: 
1. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's 
motion to suppress by concluding that the driver of the car 
containing incriminating evidence consented to a search of the 
car and/or that the officer's concern for their safety justified 
the search of the car? " [T]he factual findings underlying the 
trial court's decision with respect to a motion to suppress the 
evidence are reviewed under the deferential 'clearly erroneous' 
standard." State v. Bello. 871 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah App. 1994), 
cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 939 n.4 (Utah 1994)). The appellate court 
"'review[s] the totality of facts and circumstances of the 
particular case to determine if the finding of exigency was 
proper.'" City of Orem v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384, 1388 (Utah App. 
1994) (citing State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987) . 
2. Did Adult Probation and Parole officers have 
reasonable suspicion to conduct a second search of the car? 
Factual findings are reviewed under the clearly erroneous 
standard, as set out in paragraph one, above. While the 
determination of reasonable suspicion is a matter of law reviewed 
for correctness, some measure of discretion is accorded the trial 
court. Bello, 871 P.2d at 586 (citing Pena, 869 P.2d at 939). 
3. Has defendant waived consideration of his claim 
that evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for 
theft of firearms by failing to marshal the evidence in support 
of those convictions? "Failure to marshal the evidence waives an 
appellant's right to have his claim of insufficiency considered 
on appeal." State v. Gallecros, 851 P.2d 1185, 1189-90 (Utah App. 
1993) (refusing to consider a challenge to the jury's verdicts 
for failure to marshal the evidence in support). 
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4. Should defendant have been charged with only one 
count of second degree felony theft for stealing four rifles in a 
single criminal episode? "[The appellate court] independently 
review[s] questions of statutory construction for correctness and 
do[es] not defer to the trial court." State v. Simmons, 866 P.2d 
614, 616 (Utah App. 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
United States Constitution 
Amendment IV [Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § (1990) 
76-1-401. "Single criminal episode11 defined. 
In this part unless the context 
requires a different definition, 
"single criminal episode" means all 
conduct which is closely related in 
time and is incident to an attempt or 
an accomplishment of a single criminal 
objective. 
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal 
episode. 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted 
in a single criminal action for all 
separate offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode; 
3 
76-6-202. Burglary. 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary 
if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building 
with intent to commit a felony or theft 
or commit an assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the 
third degree unless it was committed in 
a dwelling, in which event it is a 
felony of the second degree. 
76-6-404. Theft - Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises unauthorized control over the 
property of another with a purpose to 
deprive him thereof. 
76-6-412. Theft - Classification of offenses - Action for 
treble damages against receiver of stolen 
property. 
(1) Theft of property and services as 
provided in this chapter shall be 
punishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an 
operable motor vehicle; 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the 
property stolen was more than $100 but does 
not exceed $250 [.] 
76-10-503. Purchase or possession of dangerous 
weapon/handgun - Persons not permitted to 
have - Penalties. 
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole or probation 
for a felony may not have in his possession 
or under his custody or control any dangerous 
weapon as defined in this part. 
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(b) Any person who violates this subsection is 
guilty of a third degree felony, but if 
the dangerous weapon is a firearm, 
explosive, or incendiary device he is 
guilty of a second degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Ramon Amorico Archuletta, was charged in 
a seven count amended information with burglary, theft and 
possession of a firearm by a parolee (see jurisdictional 
statement for precise rendering of charges; R. 39-40). Before 
trial, defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained by police 
and Adult Probation and Parole officers (R. 20-21, 120), and to 
correct the amended information to include only one count of 
theft of a firearm (R. 210-11). The trial court denied both 
motions (R. 200, 214). A jury found defendant guilty on all 
counts (R. 570). The trial court sentenced defendant to serve a 
term in the Utah State Prison of one to fifteen years for 
burglary of a dwelling (Count I) and for theft of a firearm 
(Counts II-V), Counts II-V to be served concurrently but 
consecutively with Count I; one year for theft (Count VI), to be 
served concurrently with Count I; and one to fifteen years for 
possession of a firearm by a parolee (Count VII), to be served 
consecutively with Counts II-V (R. 99). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 23, 1994, dispatch from the Price City 
Police Department issued an "attempt to locate" bulletin ("ATL") 
about three Hispanic males in a large brown car, license plate 
number 581 FAB, attempting to sell firearms at a convenience 
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store in Wellington (R. 122, 157). Officer Mele started to 
respond to the dispatch and was almost immediately stopped by an 
unidentified woman. She reported that while she was driving from 
Wellington into Price she saw a brown car, license plate number 
583 FAB, swerving all over the road before she last saw it near 
the Ace Lumber Yard in the east Price area (R. 123-24). 
Officer Mele soon located a brown Ford, license 
plate number 581 FAB in the Melody Estates Trailer Court (R. 124-
25). The car was parked next to a trailer at site number 41, 
which Mele knew was occupied by a Teddy Kinneman, who is parolee 
(R. 124, 129). Mele immediately requested back-up and then 
knocked at the trailer door. Within about thirty seconds a 
Hispanic-looking man, Matthew Roberts, exited the trailer, 
closing the door behind him (R. 125). 
After being informed of the reported weapons sales 
from the car, Roberts first denied that anyone had been driving 
the car, but later admitted that the car belonged to his mother 
and that he had been driving it, alone. During this interview 
Mele could hear noises from the trailer, though Roberts denied 
that anyone was inside (R. 126). 
At about this point Officers Mayerson and Boyden 
arrived and checked in with Mele (R. 125, 166-67) . Roberts 
denied any knowledge of attempts to sell firearms from the car 
(R. 126-27). Mele, however, asked Roberts if they could look in 
the car, and both Mele and Boyden heard Roberts give his consent. 
Both officers saw two rifles and a gun case, later found to 
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contain another rifle, in plain view on the rear floor board of 
the car (R. 127, 129, 137, 168-69, 176-77). Roberts then 
acknowledged that he was a parolee and not supposed to be around 
firearms, which Mele confirmed through dispatch (R. 128-29) . At 
that point Mele and Boyden arrested Roberts as a parolee in 
possession of firearms and removed and secured the weapons for 
safety reasons (R. 128-29, 137, 142, 168-69, 177, 180). 
Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) Officer Scott 
Olsen overheard Officer Mele's check with dispatch about Roberts' 
parole status and, after telling dispatch to inform Mele of 
Roberts' parole status, decided to go to the trailer site (R. 
140-41). When Olsen and his supervisor, Terry Marshall, arrived 
at the scene, Mele informed Olsen that guns had been found in the 
car, which Roberts again admitted to driving (R. 141). Following 
Roberts arrest, a body search uncovered keys that fit the car (R. 
142) .2 
Based on the ATL, Officer Mele's hearing noises from 
the trailer, Roberts' admitted use of the car and their knowledge 
that Kinneman was also a parolee, Olsen and Marshall decided to 
conduct a parole search of the trailer for Kinneman, who would be 
violating parole if he were associating with criminals, i.e., 
Roberts, with whom Kinneman had close connections in the past (R. 
132, 142, 157-61). Olsen asked for police assistance because he 
1
 Although defendant elicited from Officer Olsen that he 
did not test the key in the ignition, Olsen testified that 
Roberts told him that the keys found in his pocket were the keys 
to the car (R. 149-51). 
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did not think that just he and Marshall could safely conduct the 
search alone (R. 158-59, 170). 
After knocking at the door and requesting that 
anyone in the trailer come out and identify themselves, John 
Pimental exited. After Pimental had been handcuffed and secured 
in a patrol car (R. 143, 170-71), the officers entered the 
trailer and found defendant lying face down on the floor of a 
back bedroom (R. 143, 171). Defendant, who smelled strongly of 
alcohol, refused to identify himself (R. 144-45, 172-73) . 
Because neither of the two suspects in custody would identify 
defendant and he had no reason for being in the trailer, 
defendant was arrested for trespassing (130, 147). At the jail 
defendant identified himself and acknowledged that he had been 
paroled the day before (R. 130). 
Based on car's connection to Roberts' parole 
violation, Olsen searched the car a second time and uncovered 
seemingly out-of-place items, including a piggy bank, a camera, 
clothing, reloaded rifle cartridges and a briefcase containing 
papers belonging to a Veloy Sorensen of East Carbon, Utah (R. 
148-49, 160).2 
The defense called Roberts, who claimed that his 
mother had not given him permission to use the car, that he had 
not driven the car that day and that he had not given his consent 
2
 The key retrieved from Roberts did not fit either the 
glove compartment or the trunk (R. 151). Later, Roberts' mother 
gave the key to Marshall (R. 160). A search of the trunk and 
glove compartment uncovered no incriminating evidence (R. 316). 
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to search the car (R. 184-85). He acknowledged, however, that 
the "merchandise" was in plain view on the back seat of the car, 
all four doors of which were unlocked (R. 185) .3 The rifles, he 
claimed, belonged to a hitchhiker (R. 127). 
At trial, Officers Mele, Olsen and Boyden testified 
to substantially the same facts adduced during the motion to 
suppress (R. 258-320, 348-51) . 
Earlier in the day on which Mele responded to the 
ATL, conservation Officers Michael Milburn Kurt Enright of the 
Utah Division of Wildlife Resources were traveling from Price to 
East Carbon along state highway 6 (R. 392-393). As their patrol 
vehicle approached Sunnyside Junction, the intersection of routes 
6 and 123, Officer Milburn saw a car, which was coming from the 
direction of East Carbon, abruptly stop at the intersection and 
back into the parking area where an Associated Food semitruck was 
stopped (R. 393, 395). The car, which he identified as that 
pictured in State's exhibit 1, appeared to have three male 
occupants (R. 393, 395).4 
Scott Record, the driver of the Associated Foods 
truck, testified that the driver of the car, which had three 
occupants and was that pictured in State's exhibit 1, got out 
hurriedly and approached him (R. 399-401). The driver offered to 
sell him a rifle or a VCR for $20, but Record declined (R. 402). 
3
 Roberts' discussion also suggests that at least one of 
the rear windows was rolled down (R. 185). 
4
 At trial, Officer Mele had identified the car he found at 
the trailer court from a photograph, State's exhibit 1 (R. 263). 
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Although he could not say for sure, the driver bore a strong 
resemblance to defendant (R. 404-06).5 
Officer Olsen stated that upon uncovering the fruits 
of the search he wondered if a burglary had taken place, and he 
initiated contact with the East Carbon police to check Sorensen's 
home in East Carbon (R. 314). Police Officer Robert Setzer went 
to the Sorensen residence, saw a broken window and displacement 
of some things beneath the window inside the house (R. 373). He 
contacted Kathy Bean, Sorensen's daughter, and together they 
entered the front door, which was slightly ajar (373-74). 
According to Bean, the house had been locked when her father went 
out of town on Monday, two days earlier (R. 412-13). Inside they 
found broken glass and things askew (R. 374), including her 
mother's jewelry box, which she had never seen anywhere but on a 
dresser in the back bedroom, on the kitchen counter (R. 414). 
Sorensen confirmed his daughter's report of his 
home's disarray and the irregular placement of the jewelry box 
(R. 423). He identified the items missing from his home, 
including those items found in the search of the car found at the 
5
 When asked to identify the person whom he believed to be 
driving the car, Record pointed out an individual wearing a 
checked shirt sitting to the prosecutor's left (R. 406). 
Defendant is not identified in the record by name. However, the 
prosecutor specifically stated in closing that Record had 
identified defendant (R. 558, 566), a point not challenged by 
defendant at trial or on appeal. Other evidence tying defendant 
to the car was the discovery of his personal papers in the car 
(R. 468) and the fact that he was married to Roberts' mother, 
Viola Archuletta, owner of the car (R. 350-51). 
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trailer court.6 He also testified that the value of the stolen 
items, other than the weapons, including those which were not 
recovered, was more than $250 (R. 430-31) . Neither he nor his 
daughter had ever seen defendant or given defendant permission to 
enter his home (R. 418, 431-32). 
Price City Police Officer Edwin Shook lifted latent 
fingerprints from various items, including the jewelry box (R. 
433-38) , and sent them to Scott Spjut, latent print examiner for 
the Department of Public Safety (R. 440, 451-52, 460). Mr. Spjut 
found that one of the prints lifted from the bottom of the 
jewelry box matched defendant's left middle finger (R. 461-62). 
He testified that there was no chance that the fingerprint could 
have been that of another individual (R. 465). 
Roberts testified for the defense, assuming full 
responsibility for the thefts and burglary and claiming that 
defendant repudiated Roberts' breaking in and told him to return 
the jewelry box to the house before leaving the car in disgust. 
Later, after having loaded the rest of the goods into the back 
seat of the car, Roberts and Pimental picked defendant up and 
asked him to drive them to the trailer (R. 503-07). 
6
 The search uncovered a .22 calibre rifle (Ex. 2, R. 285), 
a .243 calibre rifle (Ex. 3, R. 270), a .270 calibre rifle and 
case (Ex. 4, R. 270), an ammunition pouch (Ex. 5, R. 286), a 
piggy bank (Ex. 6, R. 315), a briefcase (Ex. 7, R. 313-14), a 
pair of Bushnell binoculars (Ex. 8, R. 356), three pairs of 
gloves (Ex.'s 9 and 10, R. 357-58), a sweatshirt (Ex. 11, R. 
358), a bathrobe (Ex. 12, R. 358), two shirts (Ex.'s 13 and 14, 
R. 358-59), and a corduroy coat (Ex. 16, R. 360). Sorensen 
identified each of these items as his own (R. 426-430). 
11 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion 
to suppress the police officers' warrantless search of the car. 
The trial court found that the driver of the car 
gave his consent to the search. Defendant has not challenged on 
appeal the trial court's ruling that consent was given. Because 
consent is a recognized exception to both the warrant and 
probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment, and because 
defendant has waived this determinative issue on appeal, the 
Court must uphold the trial court's finding. The consent alone 
is sufficient to validate the warrantless search of the car. 
As an alternative ground for denying defendant's 
motion to suppress, the trial court ruled that the officers 
justifiably removed the firearms from the car because they 
genuinely feared for their safety. The record supports the 
propriety of the warrantless search of the car under the weapons 
exception. The investigating officers, admittedly concerned for 
their safety, were in the presence of a parole violator who was 
in close proximity to firearms and the trailer in which others 
reasonably suspected of criminal activity were hiding. 
On appeal defendant raises challenges to the 
probable cause supporting the officers search of the car. 
However, defendant did not challenge the prosecution's arguments 
in support of probable cause, but rather conceded them. 
Therefore, defendant has waived this argument on appeal. 
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episode, defendant should have been chargea with 2rA\ a single 
r.- _ , * v-ft insteaa c^ ** * + -^  ^ separate 
counts ._ : _..- .-L^ U.W-.U .. a..,- one count o4 
Therefore, based o, -rial court's original sentencing scheme, trie 
; i- „--wt. * * --^*- ^.u^ —q-ps v " *~ ^  *• h e 
exception : t -ne ;=>• . . nci J c ^ ^ i.^^.^ _:^i-,. _-_ ^ , 
and T tar ~ -*.e case : -= remanded : c the t: .a *u: " • :tr. 
. ,- - - •"^ ''
 v r
 "~1ar" - ^  seivc a - -m, on a single 
count of secoiiu deqiee ie^ . ,-f on^ to . . . _e^r vears 
consecutively with Count I. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
OBTAINED IN THE INITIAL WARRANTLESS 
SEARCH OF THE CAR 
Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his 
motion to suppress evidence obtained during warrantless searches 
of the car Roberts claimed to have been driving and of the 
trailer. Defendant's main point is that the police improperly 
relied on Roberts' parole status to search the car without a 
warrant when there were no exigent circumstances or probable 
cause to search when a warrant could readily have been obtained. 
Therefore, the initial search of the car was a violation of his 
rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
Appellant's Br. at 9-13.7 In so arguing defendant has not only 
7
 Defendant only nominally asserted state constitutional 
law grounds in his suppression motion (R. 20) and did not argue 
it at the suppression hearing. Therefore, this Court should not 
consider applying a separate state constitutional analysis on 
appeal. See State v. Scott, 860 P.2d 1005, 1007 n.3 (Utah App. 
1993) (refusing to address a standing claim under article I, 
section 14, because it was not briefed under the standards 
suggested for adequate briefing of state constitutional issues in 
State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272 n.5 (Utah App. 1990)); State 
v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992) (declining to 
consider inadequately developed argument under Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 24 (a)(9)); State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 
710-11 (Utah App. 1993) (refusing to engage in a separate state 
constitutional analysis where defendant merely alluded to the 
state constitution and did not provide any reason for adopting an 
analysis different than that applied under the federal 
constitution) cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993); State v. 
Bean, 869 P.2d 894 (Utah App. 1994) (same); State v. Carter, 812 
P.2d 460, 462 n.l (Utah App. 1991) (same) cert, denied. 836 P.2d 
1383 (Utah 1992). 
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r a ^ s e c j c-^ .^ ,., ,, . , oopr,re^ ^ •--- - existence of probable 
cause ar.^ - * 3 
critical facts and : turner.* s determinative : t nt- '.rial court's 
i: i i3 :i i IQ 8 
Defendant Does Not challenge
 0n Appeal lliat 
Roberts Consented to the Search of the Car 
"Although a w a r r a n t i e s L>>di I •. .lei^ia I 1 \ 
violative *: r -he fourth amendment [sic . - ** . settled that 
'-;:> - -- r ~; v established exceptions • *~he 
requirements ^: Lota a. warrant and proL 1^- . -a--. :. •: 
that is conducted p arsuant to consen* .t/ P12 P. 2a at 467 
- w^nnecK^c wi. - .. ^ ^la^oi.:-. ••': c "t. 
2G4i, 2043-44 (19~> • State v. Sec - . . . .  _. 
(Utah App. 19^? it r-.iina voluntary consent' notwithstanding the 
def e• •. . :- * • LiutJiii in 
English). 
The issue of consent was a primary focus of 
c - : t - .<: . I.I I k o h t I f ^  iin i 
the suppression hearing =k . 122-?c • The trial couit concluded 
that Roberts aave consent (R. 195-96) and that his possession of 
the car demons L r a U 1 I nlii 1 1 11I 111! lm , I 1 1 > 
ne argument portion of the suppression hearing followed 
by the trial r<:\.r*'s rulinc 'r "r'~ n n 0 ) — =*tt3~~«c? -- addendum 
A '. 
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consent in spite of his contrary testimony (R. 198).9 See State 
v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993) (recognizing the 
"trial court's advantaged position in judging credibility and 
resolving evidentiary conflicts"); Casida v. DeLand, 866 P.2d 
599, 602 (Utah App. 1993) (recognizing the trial court's 
prerogative to judge the credibility of witnesses and its freedom 
to disbelieve a witness's self-serving testimony). 
An appellate court will not consider issues, even 
constitutional ones, raised for the first time on appeal. The 
only exceptions are "exceptional circumstances" or plain error. 
State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 248 n.2 (Utah App. 1992). 
On appeal defendant does not even address the issue 
of consent, the primary basis of his motion to suppress (R. 195-
98). Because defendant has not even challenged the trial court's 
ruling on consent, the trial court's finding that valid consent 
was given must be upheld. Price, 827 P.2d at 248 n.2 (refusing 
to consider allegations of illegal detention on appeal which were 
not raised during suppression hearings). On the basis of 
Roberts' consent alone, this Court should find that the trial 
court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress. 
9
 The record supports the trial court's finding of consent. 
Both Officers Mele and Boyden collectively testified that Roberts 
said he had been driving the car (R. 126, 168), that the car 
belonged to his mother (R. 126) and that Roberts gave them 
permission to search the car for weapons (R. 127, 168). The 
trial court had little respect for Roberts' denial of his 
consent, based on his having lied to officers about the presence 
of others in the trailer, and rejected it in the face of the 
officer's contrary testimony, noting that a mother typically 
allows her son to use her car and that there was no evidence to 
show that Roberts' mother was readily available (R. 195-96). 
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B. The Of tictr t Reasor.ai-,. ... . . J <r. -te:y Jujrtii_. 
the Warrantless Reic-ve. :f weapon* : re: e ;a: 
As an alternative arAir.^ * ^^T.g defendant's 
suppression motion ^h^ tria". -
removal c: the firearms wa~ -ustified : . * .- offerers ,eg,Limat* 
concern ' -/ VK. ii?^  '"'" : °"7 c- T~ Bradfcrc tris 
Court out.me. ;:_ ..j^irements c^ >-„ti __- - ^ 
warrant requirementi 
When . .._ safety _ L ;...•_ .dice :r " ;— 
public is threatened, the Fou: *: 
.--.~ ndment permits officers :: : a 
Therefoie, wh- cer reasonably 
believes a sus^. angerous and may 
obtain immediate c of weapons, a 
protective search tified. See 
TfJ>
' chigan v. Long, ;.S. 1032, 1049, 
S. Ct. 3469, 3481], A:. :fficer may 
conduct a protective weapons search 
only if "'a reasonably prudent [person] 
in the circumstances would be warranted 
:r. th- relief that his [or her] safety 
or that of others was in danger.'" 
State v. Rovbal, 716 P.2d 291 292 
(Utah 1986) (quoting Terry [v. Ohio1, 
392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 9 ?t. 1868, ^ c -
Furthermore, the fa i taken in 
isolation, that a suspect is outside a 
•-hide while an officer is conducting 
earch does not overcome an officer's 
.able fear because the suspect may 
"break away from police control a~ ; 
retrieve a weapon from [the] 
automobile,'1 Long, 463 V F , • : 
103 ~ — -*• 34 8? 
State v. Bradford *-y t , zd 86b, 869--™ /TTi-^ * — 1992). 
State v. co-ue 
defendant Cole exchanged a $1,000 worth of small denomination 
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bills for $50 and $100 bills at a local grocery store, after 
which the store employee reported the incident. The police 
almost immediately stopped Cole's truck for a legitimate moving 
violation. During an inventory search and upon discovering a 
marijuana bong and twelve bags of marijuana, the police asked 
Cole if there were any firearms in the truck, and he twice 
replied no. However, one of the officers saw a half concealed 
leather pistol case among the clothes Cole was removing from the 
truck. Fearing for the safety of the other officers and 
suspicious because of Cole's apparent lies about the firearms, 
one policeman opened the case and seized a 9mm Colt pistol. The 
police then elicited from Cole that he had been convicted of a 
felony, whereupon Cole was arrested for being a convicted felon 
in possession. Id. at 121-22. The supreme court upheld the 
warrantless seizure, finding that "the officer clearly had reason 
to be suspicious of defendant," under the reasonableness standard 
in Terry. Cole, 674 P.2d at 124. 
An evaluation of the reasonableness of an officer's 
conduct when presented with a threat to his or the public's 
safety is made considering the totality of the circumstances. 
State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 666 (Utah App. 1993). 
In this case the presence of firearms in a 
potentially volatile situation was the primary reason for their 
seizure and the exigency most strenuously argued by the 
prosecution (R. 191-93) . Officers Mele and Boyden responded to 
an ATL informing them three males were attempting to sell weapons 
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ou*" of ca^ i 
implicitly suggested wrongdoing. They had good reason to believe 
une ui the thr^e v^r ^^ur* rased r* H witness's 
repeal. t~^w tne car was Sv\-;.. _ . 
the trailer, knewr \c be owned r.y a parole* :* . -• . tney 
• * - • whose xesr^ns*^ *• inauv - es about the 
firearms wcic p^a^i, * evasive an;., nuiuu . . kobei L t\ 
was only r.er- • fifteen feet from an unlocked car n which at 
l e a s • *" - ' 1 — ?.•-• 
While interviewing Koberts, M e ^ n^^iu ., r_s n o i*-~ . ier 
which Roberts denies (•<.;?•:" : eightening " r.e anxiety of the 
: • > ted * hat Robeits Loo 
was a parolee violating the conditions ^i parole (R. 128), Both 
Mele ":r'^  Boyden testified that they felt concerned for their 
safei;, 
concern was t; secure the firearms sc • \a . e .1^ I.WL *.— uat. 
against then - ceoole v'^-- n-^'^ b^ ; *- •*. ra;Ier (P. i6- . 
found that the retrieval *-apcr;s : :-. ' ne car was justified 
r
 \ "e ' ~ ~ n~err +~~ thojr ?aff^ - "- -*4 ~ a "•* ^  QP 
Considering t.^ '_-..: 
reasonableness of * "> officer :.du, • * . - ; .. shouia finu 
"* * i ndi r ^f f i ^ - M- - --sn i Boyden 
reasuiia.., v reared ; «i . :ii ~^ „ ~. - . eous ai id • 
that its .e^c ronclusic... that there were exigent circumstances 
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was correct.10 
C. Defendant Failed to Preserve His Claim that 
Police Officers Lacked Probable Cause to Search 
On appeal defendant argues that selling firearms out 
of a vehicle is not a public offense (R. 123). Appellant's Br. 
at 9-10. Therefore, defendant argues, police officers lacked 
either reasonable suspicion or probable cause of any wrongdoing. 
Appellant's Br. at 9. Defendant, however, failed to preserve 
this argument for appeal. 
As noted above, Appellee's Br. at 16, an appellate 
court will not consider issues, even constitutional ones, raised 
for the first time on appeal. State v. Price, 827 P.2d at 248 
n.2. The rationale for this rule was stated by this Court in 
State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358 (Utah App. 1993): 
10
 In addition to consent and the weapons exceptions, the 
search incident to arrest, see State v. Rochell, 850 P.2d 480, 
484 (Utah App. 1993), and the plain view exceptions, see State v. 
Cayer, 814 P.2d 604, 610-11 (Utah App. 1991), are applicable to 
this case. Although these grounds were not argued to the trial 
court, they constitute alternative grounds that would support the 
trial court's ruling. See State v. Elder, 815 P.2d 1341, 1344 
n.4 (Utah App. 1991) (noting that one exception to the rule that 
the appellate court will not address a claim first raised on 
appeal stems from "the rule that [the appellate court] may affirm 
trial court decisions on any proper ground, even though the trial 
court assigned another reason for its ruling"). 
Officers Mele and Boyden were lawfully outside the trailer 
when they encountered Roberts, having responded to an ATL 
indicating suspicious criminal activity. Even Roberts admitted 
the firearms were in plain view (R. 185). Roberts acknowledged 
his parole status to Mele before the car was searched (R. 128). 
Thereafter, Roberts was arrested and the firearms then removed 
from the car (R. 128). On these facts the warrantless search of 
the car would have been justified on both the search incident to 
arrest and plain view exceptions to the warrant requirement. 
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The purpose of requiring a properly presented 
objection is to 'putt] the judge on notice of 
the asserted error and allow[] the 
opportunity for correction at that time in 
the course of the proceeding.' Broberg v. 
Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App. 1989). 
The trial court is considered 'the proper 
forum in which to commence thoughtful and 
probing analysis' of issues. State v. Bobo, 
803 P.2d II 268, 1273 (Utah App, 1990) 
(requiring defendants to introduce their 
request for state constitutional 
interpretation before the trial court). 
Failing to argue an issue and present 
pertinent evidence in that forum denies the 
trial court 'the opportunity to make any 
findings of fact or conclusions of law' 
pertinent to the claimed error. LeBaron & 
Assoc, v. Rebel Enter., 823 P.2d 4 79, 4 83 n 6 
(Utah App, 1991) (discussing Turtle 
Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 
645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982)). 
However,, at the suppression hearing defendant 
conceded the issues of reasonable suspicion and probable cause, 
support of probable cause, defense counsel sialej :_ \ ^uess 
th r "ir?*" ^hi"^ •" - -^art i* *-t^ ,<=. -^a5 vr^bah]^ cause t a • 
the biggest thing t ;a?: stands * \:. rr.\ ~ . i :; ^e *ve a 
warranties? sc^-*" - ^ "The remainder of 
aetenaant .«.._,-_ - .-. . ect: :i v ei less of Rober ts' 
consent, the ready availability of a warrant and the involvement 
Defendant 'made i iu 1 n i I I IH i IIIH J I I n i i, >bri 1 > I * < c.duse . 
Furthermore .s apparent from the record that tne trial court 
n^^-. I i trie existence of probable cause 
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because defendant had effectively conceded the point (R. 190-
200). In having conceded the issue of whether the police lacked 
either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to suspect 
wrongdoing or to search, and because defendant has not argued 
that exceptional circumstances prevented him from raising the 
claim or that the trial court committed plain error, this Court 
should decline to address this point on its merits. 
In sum, the record abundantly supports the trial 
court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress the evidence 
seized during the initial search of car. 
POINT II 
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE OFFICERS HAD 
NOT ONLY REASONABLE SUSPICION BUT ALSO 
PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH THE CAR A 
SECOND TIME 
Defendant argues that the intrusion of AP&P was 
merely a subterfuge allowing police officers to search the 
trailer and the car a second time when they would not have had 
such authority on their own. Appellant's Br. at 12-14. He also 
argues that AP&P did not have reasonable suspicion for the two 
searches. Appellant's Br. at 15-16. The arguments misrepresent 
the facts established at the suppression hearing and are without 
legal merit. 
In his motion to suppress defendant did not 
challenge AP&P's search of the trailer (R. 20), nor did he attack 
the search of the trailer at the suppression hearing (R. 199). 
Therefore, defendant has waived this issue on appeal. See State 
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v- nice. 
In State v. Johnson, the Utah Supreme Court 
•^•^ eci the -** • ^ rtair.i n-? * ^arches i nvolving parolees: 
btate v. Velasquez, c/z r.2d 1254 
(Utah 1983), defined a parolees' Fourth 
Amendment rights. It held that a 
parole officer may conduct a lawful 
search of a parolee's apartment without 
a search warrant if the parole officer 
has "reasonable grounds for 
investigating whether a parolee has 
violated the terms of his parole or 
committed a crime." Id. at 1260. It 
is necessary that a parole officer have 
an articulable "reasonable suspicion," 
which "requires no more than that the 
authority acting be able to point to 
specific and articulable facts that, 
taken together with rational inferences 
from those facts, reasonably warrant a 
• • belief in the conclusion mooted -- in 
this instance, that a condition of 
parole has been or is being violated." 
Id. at 1260 n.5 quoting United States 
v. Scott, 678 F.2d 32, 35 (5th Cir. 
19 82), Thus, to constitute a valid 
warrantless search, there must be 
evidence (J ) that the parole officer 
has a reasonable suspicion that the 
parolee has committed a parole 
violation or crime, and (2) that the 
—^rch is reasonably related to the 
"- officer's duty. Id. a1" 126 0. 
State v. Johns. .
 : ;. (»•«ini}:»1 j a s j s 
11
 In any event, AP&P had reasonable
 S U Spi ci o n to search 
the trailer. Olsen also knew that the trailer belonged to 
Kinneman, another parolee, who had close past associations with 
Roberts (R. 142, 157,, 159) . According to Olsen, it would have 
been a violation of Kinneman's parole if he was associating with 
other criminals (R 158). Based on the noises coming from the 
trailer, suggesting the possibility that Kinneman was living with 
parolees who might be selling weapons, Olsen decided to search 
the trailer (R. 155-56). With the assistance of police (R. 158, 
170), Olsen and Marshall searched the trailer and found 
defendant., but no other contraband (R. 143-44). 
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added) . 
The basis for the parolee's diminished expectation 
of privacy lies in the state's need to administer the parole 
system "as a controlled passageway between prison and freedom." 
State v. Blackwell, 809 P.2d 135, 137 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting 
Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 1258) (urinalysis on reasonable suspicion 
that parolee had used controlled substances). 
Further, "a parole officer's search of the premises 
'is not unlawful just because it is also beneficial to the 
police.'" Johnson, 748 P.2d at 1072 (quoting Velasquez, 674 P.2d 
at 1262, and noting that the parole search was led by a parole 
officer having a reasonable and articulable suspicion based on 
probable cause for the parolee's having committed forgery). 
At the time of the events in this case Roberts was 
being supervised by AP&P, though not by Officer Olsen personally 
(R. 140). Olsen overheard a broadcast of a dispatch that 
Roberts' probation status was being checked, advised dispatch to 
inform the officers on the scene that Roberts was on parole and 
went to the trailer site with his supervisor, Terry Marshall (R. 
140-42). Officer Mele reported to Olsen that Roberts was in 
control of a car containing firearms (R. 141). After a brief 
interview, in which Roberts admitted driving the car, Roberts was 
arrested for possession of firearms (R. 141-42). Subsequently, 
Olsen conducted a search based on Roberts' admitted control of 
the car (R. 148, 159-61). The search yielded evidence later 
linked to the burglary in East Carbon (R. 148). 
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The prosecution argued that because Kinneman and 
Roberts were parolees in violation of their parole status AP&P 
reasonably searched the trailer and car (R. 193-94). Defendant, 
focussing only on AP&P's search of the car, asserted that the 
police called in AP&P to conduct a warrantless search knowing 
that they (the police) lacked the authority (R. 199). The trial 
court rejected the insinuation, noting that AP&P officers had 
independently responded to the broadcast (R. 200). Noting facts 
that demonstrated probable cause, i.e., Roberts' arrest as a 
parolee with firearms, the trial court ruled the AP&P search of 
the car proper (R. 200). Therefore, the trial court correctly 
denied defendant's motion to suppress. 
POINT III 
BECAUSE DEPENDANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL 
THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF HIS 
CONVICTIONS, DEFENDANT HAS WAIVED HIS 
RIGHT ON APPEAL TO CHALLENGE THE 
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
11
' In order to bring a claim of insufficiency of 
evidence, an appellant 'must marshal the evidence supporting the 
. . . findings and demonstrate how the evidence, including all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support 
the disputed findings.' Failure to marshal the evidence waives 
an appellant's right to have his claim of insufficiency 
considered on appeal." Gallegos, 851 P.2d at 1189-90 (citation 
omitted) (refusing to consider a challenge to the jury's verdicts 
for failure to marshal the evidence in support). 
Defendant was convicted of burglary, theft and 
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possession of a firearm by a parolee (R. 99). On appeal he 
claims that the evidence was insufficient to support only his 
convictions for theft of firearms. Appellant's Br. at 18-19.12 
In rendering guilty verdicts, the jury evidently found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that defendant had obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over firearms belonging to Veloy Sorensen 
with the purpose of depriving him of that property. 
Defendant has substantially failed to marshal the 
evidence in support of those verdicts. That evidence, summarized 
here, includes: On March 23, 1994 dispatch broadcast an ATL 
identifying a car, by license number, having three Hispanic males 
occupants attempting to sell weapons from the car (R. 259-60); an 
in-court identification of defendant as the driver of that car 
and the one who offered earlier on March 23 to sell the witness a 
VCR or firearm, the type of property stolen from a nearby 
residence (R. 401-06, 430); a witness's observation that the car 
was swerving all over the road, suggesting the driver was 
inebriated, just before the car was located at the trailer park 
(R. 260) ; the discovery of the car outside a trailer in which 
defendant, intoxicated beyond the legal limit, was hiding (R. 
309, 318); the discovery that the car contained a variety of 
Sorensen's property stolen from his home, including the firearms 
(R. 270, 285-86, 313-15, 357-60, 426-32); the car was owned by 
12
 Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of evidence 
supporting his convictions for burglary and possession of a 
firearm by a parolee. The evidence plainly supports these 
convictions. 
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defendant's wife, who is the mother of another individual 
(Roberts) found hiding with defendant in the trailer (R. 350-51) ; 
defendant's companions were Hispanic-looking, further confirming 
that the ATL referred to defendant and his companions (R. 264, 
289); defendant's personal papers were found in the car (R. 468); 
defendant's fingerprint was found on a jewelry box in Sorensen's 
home (R. 461-62); Sorensen's home had been burglarized (R. 373, 
421-23); and Sorensen had never seen defendant before nor given 
him permission to be in his home (R. 432). 
For failing to marshal these facts this Court should 
refuse to review defendant's claim that the evidence was 
insufficient to convict him of theft of firearms. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY PERMITTED 
DEFENDANT TO BE CHARGED WITH MULTIPLE 
COUNTS OF THEFT OF FIREARMS AND 
PROPERTY STOLEN DURING A SINGLE 
CRIMINAL EPISODE 
Defendant claims that he should have been charged 
only with a single count of second degree felony theft relating 
to the theft of all four firearms (Counts II-V).13 Appellant's 
Br. at 16-18. The State concedes this point, and further, notes 
that a single second degree theft charge should have embraced all 
of the theft counts, including Count VI charging a class A 
misdemeanor theft for all other property stolen in excess of $100 
13
 The amended information (R. 38-39) is attached at 
Addendum B. 
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but not more that $250.14 
In State v. Mickel, the Utah Supreme Court employed 
"the single larceny doctrine," stating: "Where many articles are 
stolen at one time, there is only one theft, whether the 
ownership is in one or in many." State v. Mickel, 23 Utah 507, 
511, 65 P. 484, 485 (1901). Accord, State v. Barker, 624 P.2d 
694, 695 (Utah 1981) (citing Mickel with approval). 
In State v. Casias, 772 P.2d 975 (Utah App. 1989), 
the defendant was convicted of two counts of second degree felony 
theft for having stolen a firearm plus personal property worth 
more than $1,000 during a single criminal episode. On appeal the 
State argued that Casias could be prosecuted "for all separate 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode." Id. (citing 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1978)). Casias contended that he 
should only have been charged with a single theft count. This 
Court agreed with Casias, noting that the offense of theft under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978), requires that the actor 
"obtain [] or exercise [] unauthorized control over the property of 
another . . . ." Id. at 977 (emphasis in original). Since the 
statute identifies unauthorized control over property generally 
as the essential element of the offense, the penalty distinctions 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1) (1978), based on type of property 
or aggregate value are classifications significant for sentencing 
purposes and do not constitute separate elements of the offense. 
14
 The arguments and the trial court's ruling are attached 
at Addendum C. 
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Id. at 911-IS. The Court concluded, therefore, that Casias 
committed one theft only, vacated the second theft conviction and 
remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its 
holding. JcL at 978. 
In this case defendant was charged with four counts 
of second degree felony theft (Counts II-V) for the theft of four 
rifles (R. 38-39). He was also charged with a class A 
misdemeanor for stealing property having a value between $100 and 
$250 (Count VI) (R. 39). Prior to trial defendant moved the 
trial court to combine the rifle thefts in a single count (R. 
210). The prosecution never presented any evidence that the 
thefts occurred other than in a single criminal episode. 
The trial court, confronted by essentially the same 
arguments made in Casias, denied defendant's motion (R. 211-114). 
Defendant did not move that Count VI, theft of property worth 
between $100 and $250, should also be combined in a single theft 
count, nor does he so argue on appeal. Defendant was convicted 
on all theft counts and sentenced to four terms of one to fifteen 
years on Counts II through V to be served concurrently but 
consecutively with Count I, and one year on Count VI to be served 
concurrently with Count I (R. 99). 
On the authority of Casias, the State acknowledges 
that defendant should have been charged with a single count of 
second degree felony theft, instead of with five counts of theft. 
Therefore, based on the trial court's original sentencing scheme, 
the State respectfully requests that all the theft charges, with 
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the exception of one second degree felony theft charge, be 
vacated, and that the case be remanded to the trial court with 
instructions to resentence defendant to serve a term, on a single 
count of second degree felony theft, of one to fifteen years 
consecutively with Count I. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing argument, the State 
requests that defendant's convictions for burglary and possession 
of a firearm by a parolee be affirmed. The State further 
requests that all the theft charges, with the exception of one 
second degree felony theft charge, be vacated, and that the case 
be remanded to the trial court with instructions to resentence 
defendant to serve a term, on a single count of second degree 
felony theft, of one to fifteen years consecutively with Count I. 
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED 
In accordance with procedures concerning oral 
argument and the issuance of opinions, effective January 1, 1995, 
the State does not request oral argument based on this Court's 
prior development of the issues raised in this case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ff day of January 1994. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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1 I is your copy and this means you1re to be here in Court today and] 
2 I tomorrow. 
THE COURT: Any other witnesses, Mr. Allred? 
4 MR. ALLRED: No, your Honor. 
5 MR. HARMOND: May we have a chance to summarize, your 
6 Honor? 
7 THE COURT: Briefly. 
8 MR. HARMOND: I will try to be brief. 
9 Officer Mele had two items of probable cause when he 
10 pulled up to that trailer and saw the brown car. He had, one, 
11 an eyewitness who had spoken to him, minutes before, that this 
12 car with this license plate number, this color with three people| 
13 in it, had been driving as if they were drunk; in fact, had cut 
14 her off trying to get on the freeway--get off the freeway. That 
15 this car was dangerous and she believed them to be intoxicated. 
16 He had an A-T-L report, same license plate number, carj 
17 matching the same descrip--description and three males, trying 
18 to sell guns out of the car. 
19 He was told by Mr. Roberts that Mr. Roberts was 
20 driving the vehicle, that it was his motherfs vehicle and that 
21 he could look in the car after they saw the guns. He didn't 
22 tell me--he knew that Teddy Kinneman lived there, this man was 
23 not Teddy Kinneman. 
24 Mr. Roberts denied there were other people in the 
25 trailer, even though Officer Mele could hear noises in the 
I 
n r\ n i o 
1 trailer. The only person who admitted to having anything to do 
2 with that vehicle that day. 
3 The other--testimony of the other officers is, after 
4 they brought the other witnesses out, they denied knowing 
5 anything, didn't know anything about the car, wouldn't tell 
6 anybody anything. The only information that 
7 all of the police officers had was that Mr. Roberts' mother 
8 owned that car, that he had been driving it and that he had 
9 given Officer Boyden and Officer Mele permission to look in the 
10 car. 
11 Officer Boyden testified he saw the weapons in plain 
12 view, he had the same information, that there was an attempt to 
13 locate on this car, with this license plate number, that three 
14 people were selling weapons out of the car. There were weapons 
15 in the car when he saw it. 
16 We have three things operating here. First, we have 
17 a consent to search, now Mr. Roberts denies; of course, he also 
18 admits to lying to the officers that day, so I don't know what 
19 credibility he has. 
20 We have two items of exigent circumstances that would 
21 allow the officers to search; one, on the crime of trying to 
22 sell the weapons and possession of weapons by a parolee. The 
23 other thing they knew is that this man was on parole. 
24 So, they've got three items of probable cause; 
25 somebody driving drunk; somebody--a parolee in possession of 
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1 weapons; the windows in the car were open, there was ammunition 
2 on the floor; I don't think these officers did anything wrong in| 
3 this situation. 
4 Maybe they could have gotten a warrant, but Officer 
5 Boyden testified--
6 THE COURT: Well, there's no question they could have 
7 got a warrant. 
8 MR. HARMOND: They could have got--yeah, they could 
9 have; but Officer--Officer Boyden testified that their policy is] 
10 officer safety. You've got a gentleman here, you've got a 
11 gentleman here who's lied to the officers, you've got noises in 
12 the trailer, you've got people there—you've got a person there 
13 who is not a resident of the trailer. He simply secured the 
14 weapons, with permission. There's nothing wrong with that. 
15 There's no violation of any search and seizure. 
16 Besides, we've got the exigent circumstances. You've 
17 got three or four pieces of evidence that said there's weapons 
18 being sold out of this car, possibly illegally; and there are 
19 the weapons. 
20 I think the officers' action in securing those weapons] 
21 is more than sensible under the situation. I don't think 
22 there's anything wrong with that. 
23 As far as a--a warrant to search the trailer, there 
24 was really no evidence found in the trailer; but they have 
25 noises in the trailer, you have two officers, Officer Olsen and 
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1 Officer Mele, who knew Teddy Kinneman. He is not the person 
2 there. He is also on parole, which is another possible 
3 violation; they had plenty of probable cause to go over there 
4 and search a parolee's house, they had plenty of reason to do 
5 that, and plenty of exigent circumstances. 
6 We don't know who's in there. We don't know if they 
7 have weapons. We don't know what's going to happen in the next 
8 few minutes. I think their--they were acting reasonably under 
9 the circumstances, your Honor. 
10 As far as the search of the car, Mr. Roberts was on 
11 parole, admits to several things. They search the car based on 
12 that. Nobody know--nobody said anything different than what 
13 Mr. Roberts said, I was driving the car today, here are the 
14 keys. 
15 So, we'll submit it on that basis, your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: Mr. Allred? 
17 MR. ALLRED: I guess the first thing to start is, if 
18 there was probable cause to do all these things, why didn't they 
19 just obtain a warrant? That's the biggest thing that stands out 
20 in my mind, we have a warrantless search here, that poses heavy 
21 burdens on the State to prove these things. 
22 The exigent--as far as exigent circumstances are 
23 concerned, we don't have anything linking these vehicles--this--
24 these reports with any particular individuals when they arrived. 
25 They knew who the car belonged to. He stated that 
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1 from the very beginning, he told them he didn't have a driver's 
2 license and first told them in fact, he wasn't driving it. The 
3 testimony today was that he never has driven it, his mother 
4 doesn't let him drive it. 
5 For the search, even if he did give consent, which he 
6 claims he did not, even if he did give that consent, for that 
7 consent to be valid, he must be able to--the State must prove 
8 that he had possession and control of the vehicle. This 
9 occurred, he wasn't in the vehicle, he wasn't near the vehicle, 
10 he was in the house. There was nothing to indicate that he had 
11 control and possession of that vehicle. 
12 THE COURT: Did he have common authority over the 
13 area? 
14 MR. ALLRED: He doesn't have the rights, the rights, 
15 the superior rights lie with Mr. Archuletta and with the mother 
16 THE COURT: But had he--had he said something, might--
17 you might have an arguable point; but I--I don't think you've 
18 got an arguable point, Mr. Allred, under these circumstances. 
19 I agree with the State's contentions and--and the 
20 evidence. You--you have some evidence that--coming from--from 
21 Mr. Roberts that there was no consent, but you have two officers 
22 that--that you'd have this Court believe are lying, whereas 
23 you'd have me believe that Mr. Roberts is telling the truth, 
24 when 
25 Mr. Roberts was lying, on the day that it happened. I just 
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can't do that. 
2 1 MR. ALLRED: But even if there is consent, we still 
3 have that control issue, that hefs not a common owner, he 
4 doesn't have possession of the car. 
5 THE COURT: But--but he claimed to, you know, I mean 
6 and the officers had nothing else to--to--other than his 
7 statement that it belonged to his mother, and of course, mothers 
8 let sons use their cars all the time. 
9 MR. ALLRED: But we can't let officers, just because 
10 they believe something, go make searches just because they 
11 believe something. The best person to have got permission from, 
12 they had knowledge of that, they had opportunities for one--they 
13 had opportunities to do it right. 
14 THE COURT: Well, but did they know where she was? 
15 How far it would be? 
16 MR. ALLRED: They went--they went right after this, 
17 they went, when they finished their search, they went and got a 
18 key to the trunk, 'cause--'cause they hadn't finished their 
19 search, they went and got a key to the trunk and completed their 
20 search, from her; so that was readily available. 
21 THE COURT: Well, but there's nothing in evidence to 
22 that effect. Thatfs the first time I've--
23 MR. ALLRED: Well, no, the reports all--the reports 
24 all list this. 
25 THE COURT: Sorry. That's the first time that I'm 
Associated Professional Reporters OOOiLG 
1 aware of that. I think unless somebody said--
2 MR. ALLRED: There's nothing to indicate, and the 
3 State hasn't proved anything contrary to that, either. It 
4 doesn't change that--that they did search, we still have the 
5 fact that the vehicle's trunk was searched and--and we don't 
6 have any evidence that--well, we have Matthew saying that he 
7 didn't have keys to the vehicle, no one--those keys--
8 THE COURT: Is there evidence in the trunk--
9 MR. HARMOND: No. 
10 THE COURT: --that you're trying to suppress? 
11 MR. ALLRED: Only that she was available--only that 
12 she was available to seek permission from her. 
13 THE COURT: And it's your--and--and your point is that 
14 it's only her, only she that can consent or-
is MR. ALLRED: Or Mr. Roberts' mother, that he wasn't in 
16 a position--if you turn the tables on that; if Mr. Archuletta 
17 was the person giving consent for the son, the son couldn't 
18 object to 
19 Mr. Archu--I mean stepson, couldn't object to Mr. Archuletta 
20 giving consent to the police. On the same token, he can't then 
21 therefore give police consent to search, either, that he's not 
22 the one who has the rights to do that. And I believe there's 
23 case law to support that. 
24 MR. HARMOND: Your Honor, we would say again that 
25 we're--it's consisting of a police officer who comes into a 
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1 potentially explosive situation, where we know there are weapons 
2 involved. We've got at least one eyewitness who said that 
3 somebody driving this car was drunk, that there are problems all; 
4 the way around, (inaudible) who's in the trailer. There's a 
5 person out here saying it's my car, or my mother's car, I'm the 
6 one who was driving it. I picked up a hitchhiker who had some 
7 weapons, but I don't know his name. 
8 We have noises in the trailer, there's nobody--
9 THE COURT: I just think that there are exigent 
10 circumstances under the--that we have here, that I--and I--I 
11 further believe that the consent of the--of the son is effective! 
12 in the position here, where no one else has claimed any--any 
13 authority to give that consent, even though he did represent 
14 that his--his mother was the owner of the car. There was no 
15 testimony as to the where--to where her--where the mother was; 
16 but even if she were available, his testimony that--that he had 
17 possession of the automobile with the owner's consent would give| 
18 him the indicia of--necessary to--to allow the--to give the 
19 consent to the officers and to give the officers authority to 
20 proceed with a--with a consent search. 
21 MR. ALLRED: But there's nothing to indicate that he 
22 had that consent. 
23 THE COURT: Well, the only--
24 MR. ALLRED: They've put on no evidence that he had 
25 consent. 
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1 THE COURT: The only evidence we had was two officers 
2 that say that this individual said that, he has disclaimed that, 
3 I understand that, and it--
4 MR. ALLRED: But you--
5 THE COURT: And I--I'm making the decision that I--
6 MR. ALLRED: Then I can address one of the other--one 
7 of the other searches. That was--that's the first search; can 
8 I address one of the other searches? 
9 THE COURT: Yes. 
10 MR. ALLRED: There--there was a case, a Utah case, 
11 State vs. Johnson, where the defendant claimed that police used 
12 the parole officers for the purpose of negating the necessity of 
13 obtaining a warrant. Police officers have been warned in the 
14 past concerning that, and they can work together; but when the 
15 police have obtained an arrest, an arrest warrant for the 
16 parolee, this case refers to that each time that they can do the 
17 search, when the proper warrants have been obtained first. 
18 Here, we have a situation that they could have called, 
19 they could have done things different, but to circumvent this 
20 whole, that they call A P & P to come in an do the searches for 
21 them so that they don't have to go obtain the warrants. 
22 MR. HARMOND: I--
23 THE COURT: But I--but I don't think the facts sustain 
24 that. 
25 MR. HARMOND: Right. 
a o e n n i a f o ^ Dmfoeeiftnal P o n n r f p r c 
1 THE COURT: The--ths facts are that the officers 
2 overheard the--the broadcast, came on their own to the--to the 
3 scene, to check on a known individual that was under their 
4 jurisdiction. I don't--I don't think that the Johnson factual 
5 situa--or that this factual situation is anywhere close to the 
6 Johnson factual situation, and in reality, it seems to the Court 
7 that--and this comes down to the--to the subsequent car search, 
8 that--that when you have the officer, or when you have the--the 
9 individual charged with a crime and arrested with a crime and--
10 and recovered the--the evidence of the crime, that is, 
11 possession of--of--of firearms by a parolee, can't they continue] 
12 the search, can't they finish the search and see if there's 
13 anything else? 
14 They've arrested the man that said that he was driving] 
15 the car and--and taken the weapons, can't they go ahead and 
16 finish the search? Do they have to get a search warrant to--to 
17 get into the trunk at that time? I don't--I think not. 
18 At any rate, your motion to suppress for the number of 
19 grounds stated is hereby denied. 
20 MR. ALLRED: We have one other matter that I think 
21 needs to be addressed probably at this basis. The State has 
22 filed a motion to amend, a motion was filed late on Friday 
23 afternoon, before the holiday. I just received the motion on 
24 Tuesday afternoon. 
25 I think we probably need to address that motion, if we] 
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ADDENDUM B 
AMENDED INFORMATION 
GEORGE M. HARMOND, JR. #1375 
DEPUTY CARBON COUNTY ATTORNEY 
120 EAST MAIN STREET 
PRICE, UTAH 84501 
(801)-637-4700 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT WITHIN AND FOR 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
AMORICO RAMON ARCHULETTA, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED 
INFORMATION 
Criminal No. 941700139FS 
Judge Bruce K. Halliday 
COMES now the Carbon County Attorney, and states on 
information and belief that the above-named defendant committed the 
following crime: 
DATE: On or about March 23, 1994 
PLACE: Carbon County, State of Utah 
COUNT I: BURGLARY OF A DWELLING, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of 
Section 76-6-202, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said defendant, at the time 
and place aforesaid, unlawfully entered the dwelling of another with the intent to commit a theft, 
to-wit: house belonging to VELOY SORENSON; 
COUNT II: THEFT OF A FIREARM, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Section 76-6-
404, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the said defendant, at the time and place 
aforesaid, did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the property of another, with a purpose 
to deprive him thereof, to-wit: Remington Model 700, .243 cal. rifle; 
COUNT III: THEFT OF A FIREARM, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Section 76-6-
404, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the said defendant, at the time and place 
aforesaid, did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the property of another, with a purpose 
to deprive him thereof, to-wit: Winchester Model 70, .270 cal. rifle; 
COUNT IV: THEFT OF A FIREARM, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Section 76-6-
404, Utah Code AnnoUted 1953, as amended, in that the said defendant, at the time and place 
aforesaid, did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the property of another, with a purpose 
to deprive him thereof, to-wit: Mauser .243 cal. rifle; 
000039 
COUNT V. THEFT OF A FIREARM, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Section 76-6-
404, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the said defendant, at the time and place 
aforesaid, did obtain or exercise unauthonzed control over the property of another, with a purpose 
to depnve him thereof, to-wit: Savage .22 cal nfle; 
COUNT VI: THEFT, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 76-6-404, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the said defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, did obtain 
or exercise unauthonzed control over the property of another, with a purpose to depnve him 
thereof, to-wit: bnef case, ammunition, VCR, two (2) wnstwatches, piggy bank, binoculars, 
clothing, knife, jewelry case, 35 mm camera, campaign nbbons, valued at more than $100.00 but 
less than $250.00; 
COUNT VII- POSSESSION OF A FIREARM BY A PAROLEE, a Second Degree Felony, 
in violation of Section 76-10-503 (2) (a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the said 
defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, while on parole from the Utah State Pnson, did have 
in his possession, or under his custody or control a firearm, 
contrary to the provisions of the aforesaid statute, and 
against the peace and dignity of the State of Utah. 
This Information is based on evidence obtained from the 
following witness(es): Robert Setzer/ 644140 & 644135 & 940161. 
Dated July 7^ , 1994. 
fcqe &C HARMOND, Jr. ^ 
Deputy County Attorney 
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ADDENDUM c 
MOTION TO COMBINE THEFT OF 
FIREARM CHARGES, ARGUMENT 
AND RULING 
1 THE COURT: I indicated that that was my ruling, to 
2 I Counsel in chambers. Mr. Allred indicated that he had an 
additional motion or some such thing that he wishes to make. 
MR. ALLRED: Your Honor, if I could address the issue 
5 I of Counts 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Information, I guess we can call 
6 I it the--
THE COURT: Of the--of--now--
8 I MR. ALLRED: We'll call it the amended Information, 
9 the very most recent amended Information. 
10 THE COURT: The one that I've just authorized entered. 
11 MR. ALLRED: Yes, your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: Thank you. 
13 MR. ALLRED: For that count there, the defendant is 
14 being charged with four counts of theft of a firearm, as a 
15 second-degree felony. Each of those counts are alleged to have 
16 taken place at the same time, at the same place. 
17 The law would require that specific intent be alleged 
18 for each of those, or at least a--a specific incident be 
19 required for each of those. I think under the situation, with 
20 the amendment, that I don't think that occurs, and I think that 
21 these are all--occur out of one incident, and that it would be 
22 inappropriate for the amendment to contain four separate 
23 charges, but that it would be appropriate for it to contain one-
24 -one charge of the theft of a firearm. 
25 I don't think the State is even alleging separate 
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1 offenses--I mean separate--I can't say offenses--separate 
2 incidences occurring on this. These all arose out of, I 
3 believe, even the same gun cabinet, and that that would be 
4 inappropriate for him to be tried on all four of those. 
5 In my opinion, we'd have a situation where it would bel 
6 similar to that of, not really a double jeopardy, but he's being) 
7 tried on the same count four different times, and have that 
8 potential, and I don't think that's a--that would be a correct 
9 situation. 
10 THE COURT: Take four cupcakes from--do you have four 
11 charges of retail theft? I guess that's the point you're 
12 making. 
13 MR. HARMOND: May I address that, your Honor? 
14 THE COURT: You may. 
15 MR. HARMOND: Thank you. 
16 If the Court will note the construction of the statute! 
17 under 76-6-412, which is classification of theft offenses. 
18 Generally, that is classified as either a misdemeanor or certain] 
19 category of offense, misdemeanor or felony, based on value. 
20 And that's the value of either the property stolen 
21 and/or the services which were stolen, as in the case of cable 
22 T.V. theft, things of that nature. 
23 The exception to that is value--is property that is 
24 either a firearm or a--an operable motor vehicle. Those two are 
25 under separate subsection, being under 76-412.1 Subsection 2--
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1 excuse me, Subsection (a), Subsection 2, which says — states, 
2 theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall 
3 be punishable as a felony of the second degree if the: (1) 
4 value of the property or services exceeds $1,000; (2) property 
5 stolen is firearm or an operable motor vehicle. 
6 The reason for the separate counts is that if you 
7 steal a firearm or a motor vehicle, that's a second-degree 
8 felony, it's not an aggregated charge, as is the rest of the 
9 theft. 
10 As in the Court's example, if you steal the four 
11 cupcakes, what's the value? That's what you're looking at. But 
12 the legislature has specifically carved out firearms and motor 
13 vehicles to be classified as a separate offense. 
14 That's the reason they're charged that way, your 
15 Honor, is because each theft is a second-degree felony, by the 
16 way the statute is written. 
17 THE COURT: How does that play off on the criminal 
18 episode statute? 
19 MR. HARMOND: I think the criminal episode statute 
20 prevents me from filing four separate felonies, fel--four 
21 separate felonies at four different times; in other words, this 
22 is a single criminal episode and I'm alleging everything that 
23 occurred in that criminal episode, including the four separate 
24 thefts of four separate firearms. j 
25 If I were to file an Information today, if I'd filed 
103 
1 I an Information that alleged the theft of two firearms, and if we] 
2 were not successful today, I allege the theft of two other 
3 firearms later on, I think that's where the single continuing 
4 criminal episode statute comes into play. 
5 I can't put him at jeopardy twice for the same 
6 criminal episode. That's what the--
7 THE COURT: But isn't there another part of that 
8 statute that says--I'm calling back, but isn't--doesn't that 
9 statute say that you can't charge two offenses--it--if the same 
10 behavior is a breach of this law and that law, it can only be 
11 charged on the more serious law. That's the part of the statute 
12 that I'm trying to--to--
13 MR. HARMOND: What is says is, that a defendant may be 
14 prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses] 
15 arising out of a single criminal episode. However, when the 
16 same act of the defendant under a single criminal episode shall 
17 establish offenses which may be punished in different ways under] 
18 different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable 
19 only under one such provision. An acquittal or conviction or 
20 sentence under any such provision bars prosecution under any 
21 other provision. 
22 In other words, we have to combine everything we have 
23 in one prosecution. 
24 THE COURT: Bring that to me, would you, please? 
25 MR. HARMOND: Certainly, your Honor, it's under-
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1 THE COURT: What you just read is just saying what I 
2 thought I understand it to mean. 
3 MR. HARMOND: 6-1-402. 
4 THE COURT: Mr. Allred, did you want to respond to--to 
5 that inquiry? 
6 MR. ALLRED: As far as the statements before, too, we 
7 have that theft is one of the elements also of the burglary, and] 
8 then we have also charged another misdemeanor theft all 
9 occurring in the same situation. 
10 And to maybe look at this again in a different light 
11 is if--if an item, let!s say that he'd just taken the gun 
12 cabinet, even itself, where the guns were contained, wefd still 
13 have one incident of theft, and wefd still have to have separate] 
14 incidences, separate elements and separate situations to--each 
15 to warrant those. 
16 Now, if we had separate situations, they could all--I 
17 know the statute for sure says that they can all be brought up 
18 at the same time if itfs close in time; but we1re talking 
19 separate offenses, still, and to establish a separate offense, 
20 you still have to have your own individual or your own specific 
21 intent or your incidents to--to do that, I think. 
22 THE COURT: I think that I agree with Mr. Harmondfs 
23 interpretation of this particular statute, that—that in fact, 
24 the legislature has designated that--that each firearm is a 
25 separate offense. 
I don't think that the--the criminal episode statute 
affects that change in this particular case, where each of them 
are individual, separate offenses under the--under the Code. I 
think it deals with where there are two--where the--where the 
exact same conduct is punishable in two different ways, whereas, 
this is--itfs the exact same conduct. 
For instance, if--if he took the--the gun case with 
three guns in it, that's the same as the three guns that he 
took, but that as a matter of fact, he took the gun cabinet and 
three guns, so that he could be charged with--
MR. HARMOND: Statute says you111 determine what 
degree it is based on the value of the gun cabinet, but yet, the] 
firearms part is separate. 
THE COURT: Separate and apart and on their own. 
So, and that will be the ruling of the Court. 
MR. HARMOND: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Bring in the jury, potential jury, if you 
would. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Your Honor, may I approach? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Mr. Allred, Mr. Archuletta has indicated that he 
wishes to be--to change clothes and not been seated in the--with] 
his cuffs, and I think that's appropriate under the 
circumstances. 
MR. ALLRED: Yes, your Honor. 
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